yesterday officially published report IAC on the investigation into the catastrophe of the Polish "board number 1" Smolensk April 10, 2010. text of the report .
Well, what can I say. In describing happened all expected - a collision with the ground in controlled flight, which took place against a background of significant violation of the minima of weather. But that's all that preceded ...
for mission-critical flight aboard the number 1 on the airfield is not equipped with automatic approach chosen crew with the following raid on this type of aircraft: the commander of ~ 2200 of them as a FAC of ~ 600, the second pilot's 198 hours, 59 hours a navigator, flight engineer with 300 hours. When This FAC, without instructor approval, periodically flew co-pilot in the other carriages, the co-pilot - co-driver and navigator - the second pilot on the Yak-40. In addition simulator training in a special flight detachment of Defense of Poland for the crews of Tu-154 never carried out.
crew, having no projection and the actual Weather aerodrome of destination, selected as one of the alternate aerodromes Vitebsk, which in this day did not work, decides to take off. Information the weather seems to have got lost somewhere in the diplomatic channels. However, the presence of the forecast still would not help because dangerous phenomenon - the fog, it is not predicted and began to weather forecasters by surprise.
When the board was already over Belarus, a change of duty airfield north of Smolensk, noted the appearance of heavy fog and had several early measurements of meteorological parameters. It turned out that the prescribed minimum airfield 100h1000 (lower border clouds of 100 m, 1000 m horizontal visibility), fog gave the order of 80h800 and later 60h600. Normal civilian airfield in such circumstances would simply shut down, and planes went to the spare. But this board was military, and in addition belonged to another state. Legal aspects of such operations worked enough well, resulting in Russia, Poland and several other countries, the decision to land in such circumstances at the discretion of the commander of the crew. Manager can not recommend landing, but to ban it can only be used if the band appeared obstacle (car, other aircraft).
way our IL-76 one hour before the accident Polish Tu-154 made a couple of hits when it was still on the edge (100h1000), convinced that the weather - the seams, and flew to spare.
at 10:25 am (time Moscow) Polish plane crew was informed that it's worth the fog, bad weather and the conditions for admission there, and then asked for "a trial setting." The head of airport operations has allowed entry to the condition that a height of 100 meters should go to the second round. Around this time, on a different frequency crew of the Polish Yak-40 plane had arrived a little earlier, according to the presidential board that the visibility he estimated about 200 meters
Inside, there was some discussion of the situation and in the cockpit apparently appeared commanding the Polish Air Force. He did not order the crew to land in whatever you become. But, they say, silently stood over the soul. "Subsequently, on the typical personal injury, medical examiners determined that he was likely in the time of the accident was there in the cockpit.
Recall that in August 2008 during a flight from Tallinn-Warsaw-Simferopol-Ganja with top leaders of Poland, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, when receiving in Simferopol order to fly to Tbilisi, instead of Ganja, commander of the board refused to do so due to lack of aeronautical and meteorological information for that was almost given later by the court and never included in the composition of the crews' board number 1 ". The commander of the rescue flight crew was in the co-pilot and most likely well remembered the case.
Sunset was carried out non-standard, not described in the aircraft Flight Manual and is not permitted at this airfield way - using the FMS, which has previously been asked a number of points. Computer FMS, using positioning signals of GPS, ran plane through the channel ABSU roll (ie the rate), and the channel pitch (descent-ascent) to manage a crew with the help of the autopilot controls. How
Anyway, to the point of entrance to the glide path they have successfully reached, but with increased speed and altitude, and to "fit" the glide path were forced to increase vertical velocity (lower). As a result, the flight path in the vertical plane although it is mostly within tolerances, but in fact crossed the centerline of the glide path downward. Manager for almost all the time reduction for the final approach point the aircraft was within the "corridor Tolerances on the radar screen, and only seeing a rapid decline at the very end, he asked the crew to go in level flight, and a little later and go in the second round. His messages were accepted (the record exists in the onboard tape recorder), but the actions have been made.
By reducing the landing straight line is the concept of "decision height". This is the height at which KBC has seen the band or its lights, to assess the spatial position of the aircraft, and depending on this to continue the landing or go-around. This is one of the most important laws of instrument flight, a failure which has repeatedly ended very, very tragic. Under these conditions, the CDF had a value of 100 m, which is under the cloud of 50-60 m not allowed to see the band, and hence landing was impossible.
What were they thinking with this entry the young commander, performs an important flight, so even with the breathing almost in the back of the Commander Air Force - we will never know.
In the process of trying to fit into the glide path alarm went dangerously close to the ground. It just nobody no attention, but around the same time on the FAC QFE altimeter (745 mm Hg) were dropped on a standard (760 mm Hg), which led to an overestimation evidence that the altimeter on the level of the band at 160-170 m, which coincided with the termination of signaling. Who did it and why - could not be established. Probability inadvertent actuation buttons, according to experts, is vanishingly small.
Navigator, in violation of the rules, counting at this stage call height is not the barometric altimeter and radar altimeter on, voicing the numbers aloud to the commander and the copilot. Since the course was located almost across the hollow-beam depth of 40 m, this resulted in the aircraft for all devices decreased, and the height of fall is much slower than desired. Slope of the ravine was coming down. Barometric altimeter FAC showed exaggerated statements, and not the fact that the FAC in general looked at him - probably he was looking through the eyes of the earth and the lights of the strip. But did not find them.
That is, the vertical velocity of about 8 m / s, the aircraft crossed the CDF (100 m), and continued to fall. No one said anything words - except for the navigator, counting down the height. KBC is likely not looking at the instruments and did not appreciate that the CDF is passed. At periodic new response alarm system dangerously close to the ground, nobody paid attention, but the co-pilot, when the CDF was already passed, hesitantly said "goodbye?" and slightly pushing the wheel away from you, apparently by instinct. Signal collision avoidance system with the ground took the character of "anxiety" and sounding more than 10 seconds - until the moment disaster. The aircraft continued to decline, and here and counter-slope beams increased.
point of the first collision with the trees is approximately 20 m below the runway on a gentle slope. After the collision the crew made a desperate attempt to convert the aircraft to climb, taking the helm themselves to stop and abruptly moving the arm motor control in advance. But there was a clash with the old birch tree with a diameter of 30-40 cm, having come off nearly 7-meter polukryla piece left, which led to intense kreneniyu left overturn the aircraft more than 180 o and falling in the woods upside down. And the estimated experts, even if the birch there was no relief would avoid collision with the ground, so sharp maneuver would still have led to the exit plane to supercritical angles of attack, stalling, and almost the same accident, only a little further.
course, many will now assume that the crew aircraft are to blame. This spot in their memory to flush it, probably not. But they - also victims of this situation. Who made this mess in flight training in a special squadron? Who let the flight at an airfield complex inexperienced crew? Who made that top officials exert psychological pressure on the crew, and the more he breathed in the back of a complicated stage of the flight?
Our head landing, too, got a chicken in oschip. He then surely and was glad to close the airfield nafig and send the planes to spare. But could not, had no right ...
is the story of the death of Tu-154 b / n 101 and 96 people on board April 10, 2010
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